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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UT AH PACKERS, INC. AND UNDER-
WRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH AND LAWRENCE L. SCRUGGS, 
Defendants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case 
No. 11887 
This is a review of the proceedings before the Indus-
trial Commision of Utah, which resulted in an order by the 
Commission that the Plaintiffs pay to the Defendant 
Lawrence Scruggs temporary-total disability compensation 
for a period of time commencing with back surgery per-
formed upon him to and until such time as he may be re-
leased to go back to work by his doctors, as well as compen-
sation for permanent disability such as may be determined 
thereafter. The award by the Industrial Commission was 
based upon the findings of the medical panel that the ap-
plicant's basic back pathology resulted from an injury by 
accident which occurred during the course of his employment 




The Commission awarded compensation based upcn 
a finding that the disabling pathology was fully attributable 
to an injury sustained by him while in the Plaintiffs employ 
but denied compensation for the period of time between the 
date of injury and the date of his first surgery. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent agrees with the Industrial Commission's 
disposition and award except as to the point in time at 
which compensation should have commenced to be paid. 
The Respondent-applicant claims the award of the Com-
mission to be inconsistent with the findings of fact and 
requests that the period of compensation commence from 
the date of injury and continue until he is released for 
work by his physician 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Applicant was on the 7th day of July, 1967, a 
husky young man twenty-seven years of age, who had 
worked for a number of years as a laborer on heavy con-
struction in Northern California. On the date stated he 
reported for work at the Plaintiff, Utah Packers, Inc. can-
ning factory where he worked on the night shift to support 
himself and family while he attended the Brigham Young 
University. Jn process of his employment he was lifting 
boxes, each containing six-one gallon cans of canned pro-
duce. In lifting a box from the ground (record page 7, 19) 
his fellow workers observed him to drop the box in re-
sponse to sudden onset of back-pain He was unable to stand 
or sit and was removed from the cannery by ambulance. 
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The Applicant was treated first by Dr. Clark, the 
Plaimiff's physician who diagnosed his injury as a "back-
sprain" a11d referred the Applicant to Dr. Faust, a Chiro-
practor. After Chiroproctic treatments failed to alleviate 
the pain, the Applicant was seen by Dr. Nephi Kezerian, an 
orthopedic surgeon, who made a cursory and inconclusive 
physical examination (see page 6 of Dr. Kezerian deposi-
tion) and eventually the Applicant was granted perm:ssion 
to be treated by Charles M. Smith, Jr., another orthopedic 
surgeon in Provo, Utah. 
Subsequent to neurological and psychiatry examination 
done at Dr. Smith's request by Dr.'s Jack L. Tedrow and 
Madsen H. Thomas, Dr. Smith placed the Applicant in the 
hospital and had a mylogram performed. 
On the 8th day of April, 1968, Dr. Smith performed 
back surgery with further corrective surgery on DecEmber 
6, 1968 (Dr. Holbrook deposition, page 16). 
The medical panel report which was filed November 
25, 1968, (prior to the second surgery) recounts in detail 
all of the medical findings of all of the Doctors and states 
(page 5, Medical Panel report) that the applicant had not 
been able to work since the time of the injury on July 7, 
1967. The findings by the Medical Panel were that there 
was a medical probability that the episode at work on 
the 7th of July, 1967, created the subsequent total-
temporary disability and the need for surgery, that the 
patient had been totally disabled since that time and 
that there was no medical evidence of any significant pre-
existing injury nor was there evidence of any neurosis, 
psychosis or personality disorder. Plaintiff objected to the 
Medical Panel report and hearing was held on the 10th day 
of February, 1969. On February 27, 1969, Plaintiff filed 
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a motion to admit into the records of the Industrial Com-
mission, the records of the California Industrial Commis,.ion 
relative to a prior Industrial claim made by the Defendant. 
The Industrial Commission over objection from the Appli-
cant received the California Industrial Commission papers 
in toto on the 21st of March, 1969, and the Hearing Ex-
aminer made his findings of fact and an order awarding 
temporary-total disability on the 10th day of June, 1969. 
Because of patent errors in calculation and upon request 
duly made, the Industrial Commission amended the Hear-
ing Examiner's order by an amended order dated July 22, 
1969 and a second amended order dated August 27, 1969, 
and it is from the second amended order that Plaintiff's 
appeal to the Supreme Court was made. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALL EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE APPELLANT, 
IN REQUESTING A REHEARING WAS ALREADY BE-
FORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PRIOR TO 
THE ENTERING OF THE COMMISSION'S AW ARD. 
There is without question a great amount of conflict 
in the evidence, which fact was considered in depth by both 
the Medical Panel and by the Industrial Commission. The 
statements of Dr. Craig Clark, Dr. Faust and Dr. Kezerian, 
based on their cursory examinations and treatments would 
possibly fail to show a medical probability of connection 
between the incident in the Plaintiff's cannery and sub-
sequent back surgery. The medical conclusions of Dr. 
C. M. Smith, Jr. based upon an indepth examination, in-
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eluding neurogical studies, psychiatry examination, a mylo 
g-ra:11 and two surgical entrances into the applicant's back 
effectively refute any preliminary diagnosis of "mere back 
strain." All of these matters were taken into account by 
the Medical Panel, resulting in a favorable finding o l the 
applicant's claim of injury. Plaintiff's brief quotes from 
Dr. Kezerian's report of September 25th, indicating a pre-
liminary diagnosis of a simple strain but ignores Dr. 
Kezerian's later sbt.?ment (Kszerian deposition, page 6) : 
"I did not make a disability evaluation. And th'3 
reason was that I felt that my study was incom-
plete and limited." 
Dr Kezerian on the same page, further states: 
"My is not intended to be conclusive, 
and for this reason I insist?d that he 2ee a neurol-
ogist or a neuro-surgeon." 
Likewise, the records from California proffered by 
Plaintiff and considered in full by the Industrial Commis-
sion, disclosed that Dr. Rentschler in a letter to the Calif-
ornia State Compensation Insurance Fund, dated November 
26, 1965, advised hospitalization and further diagnostic 
studies. The same Doctor in his letter of February 18, 1966 
to Mr. Dahnan of the Claims Department for State Compen-
sation Insurance Fund concluded that there was no neuro-
logical function abnormality observable at that time, thus 
reversing his own prior diagnosis. This too was considered 
by the Industrial Commission prior to the granting of the 
award. 
This Court has ruled many times that the Industrial 
Commission may consider any evidence which comes before 
it and as the finder of fact resolve any discrepancies as 
they best d2termine (see Morrelly vs. Industrial Commission 
et al., number 11547, filed September 22, 1969.) Our statute 
provides that the Industrial Commission findings are con-
clusive and final and not subject to review. (Section 35-
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1-85, UCA, 1953.) If there is substantial evidence to sup-
port the findings the Supreme Court will not rever the 
Industrial Commission (Vance vs. Industrial Commission, 
17 Ut 2d 217, 407 P. 2d 1006 (1965). As recently as De-
cember 1, 1969, this Court held in Kennecott Copper Corpo-
ration vs. the Industrial Commission, et al., (No. 11645, 
filed December 1, 1969 :) 
"The Commission having made its findings upon 
conflicting evidence, it is the duty of this Court to 
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
findings and order of the Commission. As we 
view the evidence, while it is widely divergent, 
nevertheless there is creditable evidence in the 
record to support the Commission findings. We 
are not inclined in this case to depart from the 
principles announced in numerous prior decisions 
by the Court." 
The Industrial Commission in the instant case found 
in favor of the Applicant after having considered fully the 
Medical Panel hearing, the Hearing Examiner's report and 
after having allowed into the record all of the hearsay 
evidence from California which is by the Appellant now 
offered again. It would appear pointless to refer the same 
materials back to the Industrial Commission for another 
hearing on the same record as requested by the Appellant. 
POINT 2 
THE COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ITS FAILURE TO AWARD COMPENSATION TO THE 
APPLICANT COMMENCING WITH THE DAY OF AC-
CIDENT INSTEAD OF THE DAY OF THE SURGERY 
FROM WHICH DAY THE AW ARD ACTUALLY COM-
MENCED. 
The award of the Industrial Commission was made 
pursuant to their adoption of the findings of fact and con-
7 
of law of Robert J Shaughnessy (Page 5, Hearing 
gx;1 niaer's report) which adopted the special medical 
µa11el report in that portion finding a reasonable medical 
probability that the episode at work on July 7, 1967, cre-
ated the subsequent total-temporary disability and the need 
for surgery. The reason given by the Hearing Examiner for 
not adopting the other conclusions and recommendations 
of the Medical Panel (last Paragraph, Page 4, Hearing 
Examiner report) were that: 
"the next independent evidence of total disabilit"r 
would occur at the time of the Applicant's hospital-
ization for surgery-just prior to the hearirg of 
April 8, 1969. Any additional temporary total-
disability would commence from that date." 
This tends to ignore the Medical Panel evidence on 
Page 5 of the Medical Panel report quoting Dr. Smith's 
independent report as concluding: 
"All of his studies up to the present time have 
been consistent with the presence of an Industrial 
injury. This is verified not only historically but 
clinically and surgically." 
And further down the same page the Medical Panel 
finds: 
"He has not been able to work since the time of 
the injury on the 7th day of July, 1967." 
This Court has held in Griffin vs. Industrial Com-
mission, 16, Ut. 2d 264, 399 P. 2d 204, and other cases 
cited therein: 
"The other pertinent issue is whether the Commis-
sion should have allowed medical testimony to 
prove a connection between the slipping incident 
and the present ailment suffered by Plaintiff when 
no competent evidence was offered to show injuries 
from the slipping incident ... where the injury 
complained of affects the internal anatomy, by 
what means but through medical testimony can 
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petitioner prove that her ailments were caused 
by the accident? 
We do not say that the Commission wrongly de-
cided the case. It well established that the Com-
mission can receive any kind of relative evidence, 
and it is further established that the commission 
is not obliged to believe the Plaintiff's testimony, 
unless such belief is so unreasonable as to be arbi-
trary and capricious. But the Plaintiff in this 
case should be given the opportunity to introduce 
medical testimony in an effort to prove that the 
plyboard incident was the proximate cause of her 
present ailments." 
Applicant states he did not and could not work at any 
time since the accident and this was verified medically by 
both Dr. Smith and the Medical Panel's conclusions. No 
contrary evidence is in the record. Disbelief in face of the 
facts would indeed be so unreasonable as to be arbitrary 
and capricious. 
It should be pointed out that the Hearing Examiner 
concluded that Applicant was lying because of the California 
papers relating to a prior Industrial accident claim, but 
Applicant was denied an opportunity to explain, or to 
cross-examine or question those whose records were ac-
cepted by the Hearing Examiner as gospel truth. As ap-
pears on the California papers, that matter resulted from 
a fall in which Applicant's legs and thighs were bruised, 
causing temporary pain. The matter was pursued on Ap-
plicant's behalf by a union attorney. No hearing of any 
kind was held but a settlement was arranged after Applicant 
left California. The reason stated in the Compromise and 
Release form (P.2) is: 
"9. Reason for compromise. The nature and ex-
tent of permanent disability being in dispute, the 
parties wish to avoid the hazards of litigation." 
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Such a compromise makes it apparent that the claim 
disposed of merely to close the record and certainly, 
as a compromise did not acknowledge any specific injury 
to Applicant's back. There was in fact none, as was deter-
mined medically by Dr. Smith and verified by the Medical 
Panel. 
Section 35-1-45 UCA, 1953 provides: 
"Every employee ... who is injured ... by ac-
cident arising out of or in the course of his em-
ployment, wheresoever such injury occurred, ... 
shall be entitled to receive, and shall be paid, such 
compensation for loss sustained on account of such 
injuries or death ... as herein provided." 
Section 35-1-65, UCA, 1953, provides 
"In case of temporary disability, the employee 
shall receive sixty percent of his average weekly 
wages so long as such disability is total ... " (Em-
phasis ours) 
This Court has considered the question of when a cause 
of action arises under Workman's Compensation laws, as 
follows: 
"Not until there is an accident and injury and: a 
of loss from the injury, does the duty to 
pay arise. A mere accident does not impose the 
duty to pay. Accident plus injury therefrom does 
not impose the duty. But accident plus injury 
which results in disability or loss gives rise to the 
duty to pay." 
Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission, 93, U 510, 
74, P.2d 657. 
It is submitted then that the record in Applicant's case 
shows without equivocation that Applicant was injured 
on July 7, 1967, while on the job in Appellant's cannery, 
that he was temporarily totally disabled and unable to 
work from that time until the present and was under stat-
ute, entitled to compensation for that period. Arbitrary 
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selection of the date of surgery as the time for starting 
compensation would require a different findings of fact than 
relied on by the Industrial Commission in making their 
award. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission A ward should commence 
with the date of injury, July 7, 1967. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MAXFIELD, GAMMON, ELLIS & 
MCGUIRE 
Attorneys for respondent-applicant 
28 North 1st East 
Provo, Utah 84601 
By: Glen J. Ellis 
